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Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment
Kenneth L. Karstt
Freedom of speech is indivisible; unless we protect it for all, we
will have it for none.
HARRY KALVEN, JR.
The ideal of equality runs deep in the American tradition.' A
just society, we believe, must offer "equal liberties ' 2 in the realm
of political participation. Within the past generation, this tradition
has flowered into a number of new constitutional doctrines, aimed
at effectuating the ideal of political equality.3 In the aggregate, these
doctrines mark the emergence of a principle of equal liberty of ex-
pression, not merely in the political arena, but throughout all the
interdependent "decisionmaking" processes of a complex society.4
A natural doctrinal vehicle for promoting the principle of equal
liberty of expression is the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.-
In a number of recent cases involving first amendment interests, the
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. I am grateful to my colleagues
Professors Melville B. Nimmer and Harold W. Horowitz, who commented on a draft of this
article.
I When the ideal of equality was enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, the
contrast between ideal and reality was dramatic. Suffrage, for example, was commonly lim-
ited in the newly independent states not merely to males but to property owners. See C.
W,.L ,MSON, AMRIuCAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860, at 92-116 (1960).
And Jefferson, the author of the Declaration's language about equality, owned slaves.
2 See J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 205-11 (1971).
E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ("one person, one vote"). This application
of the principle of equality held little appeal for the Framers of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (1787) (J. Madison).
Thomas Emerson properly concludes that the principle of freedom of expression:
• .. carries beyond the political realm. It embraces the right to participate in the
building of the whole culture, and includes freedom of expression in religion, literature,
art, science, and all of the areas of human learning and knowledge.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESION 7 (1970). Alexander Meiklejohn gives
us a curiously narrower view of the same freedoms:
I believe, as a teacher, that the people do need novels and dramas and paintings
and poems "because they will be called upon to vote."
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 263.
1 Throughout this article, the expression "equal protection" includes the right to equality
guaranteed against the federal government by the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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Supreme Court has used the framework of equal protection analysis
to limit government's power to restrict free expression.' This ap-
proach has met with the objection, both within and outside the
Court, that the first amendment itself would have been a more
appropriate ground for decision. 7 Framing the problem of free ex-
pression in equal protection terms, it is said, misses the basic pur-
pose of the first amendment, which is not equality but liberty.' By
emphasizing the equality principle, the Court may invite govern-
ment to equalize not by lifting restrictions from some but by sup-
pressing the expression of all The principle of equality may have
its uses in ensuring the freedom of expression, the critics argue, but
those uses are marginal to the first amendment's main goals.
This line of argument is misleading. Although the critics' pref-
erence for the first amendment as a ground for decision is perfectly
sound, their argument gives life to a false assumption about the
amendment's meaning. The principle of equality, when understood
to mean equal liberty, is not just a peripheral support for the free-
dom of expression, but rather part of the "central meaning of the
First Amendment." 10
Although the Supreme Court has only recently recognized the
centrality of the equality principle in the first amendment, the prin-
ciple was implicit in the Supreme Court's "public forum" deci-
sions" as well as in its decisions protecting the associational rights
of political minorities. 12 More fundamentally, the principle of equal
liberty lies at the heart of the first amendment's protections against
government regulation of the content of speech. Proper appreciation
of the importance of the equality principle in the first amendment -
suggests the need for a reconsideration of the results reached by the
Supreme Court in several doctrinal subspheres.
6 See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968).
See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 38-40, 41-42 (1968) (Douglas, J., & Harlan,
J., concurring); Note, Equal But Inadequate Protection: A Look at Mosley and Grayned, 8
HAIv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 469 (1973).
1 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring). But cf. Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitu-
tional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 328, 338 (1963).
9 See Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1482, 1492-97 (1970);
Note, supra note 7, at 476-77.
,' The phrase, "central meaning of the First Amendment," is borrowed from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964), by way of Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191.
" See text and notes at notes 84-110 infra.
,2 See text and notes at notes 111-16 infra.
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Just such a reconsideration is the aim of this article. When the
equality principle is applied to content regulation, it demands a
rethinking of several lines of decision. In the "public forum" area,
where the equality principle made its first appearances, a clear
understanding of the principle should encourage the Court to aban-
don inconsistent precedents. The principle of equal liberty of ex-
pression also calls for a new look at the problem of access to the
communications media. Finally, the first amendment's equality
principle implies further constitutional progress toward equaliza-
tion of the electoral process:
Exploring these doctrinal areas in light of the principle of equal
liberty of expression will necessarily raise ancillary questions long
familiar in equal protection analysis: the problem of inequalities
resulting from hidden or inexplicit "classifications," the relation
between formal and substantive equality, the "stopping-place"
problem, and analogies to the "state action" limitation. All will be
considered as they bear on first amendment determinations. In
short, this article explores the consequences for first amendment
doctrine of the Supreme Court's adoption of the principle of equal
liberty of expression. Before embarking on that exploration, how-
ever, we examine the equality principle in relation to the first
amendment's main purposes, and we pause to appreciate the
Court's first full articulation of the principle in Police Department
of the City of Chicago v. Mosley."3
It may be, as Paul Freund has remarked, that a memorial occa-
sion like this one normally provides "an even truer insight into the
speaker than into the subject." 4 Yet Harry Kalven surely would
have approved the aims of this analysis, however he might have
judged its execution. His writings repeatedly touched on aspects of
the equality principle in the first amendment, and my debt to him
will be plain to anyone who compares his pages to these. 5 In any
,3 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
14 P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 13 (1951).
5 Ten years ago, I set out to write a review of Kalven's book, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1965). The project led me to look back at all of his writings on the first amend-
ment, and the review turned into an article, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An
Appreciative Comment on the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1965).
It was becoming clear in 1965, and it is quite clear today, that Kalven's contributions to the
growth of constitutional law are matched by those of only a handful of people outside the
Supreme Court. The present article is still another testimony to the ways in which Kalven
has shaped first amendment thinking. It is noteworthy, in an unbelieving age, that Kalven
paid attention to doctrine, as something that mattered. His gift to us was a lawyer's gift:
careful doctrinal analysis, with doctrine pinned to reality. That he wrote as he talked, bub-
bling over with humor and intellectual excitement, is a bonus we can still enjoy.
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case, the Freund dictum can be turned to good use. On another
memorial occasion, 6 Harry Kalven wrote in paraphrase of his sub-
ject, Justice Black:
Freedom of speech is indivisible; unless we protect it for all, we
will have it for none.17
I. EQUALITY AND THE PURPOSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The principle of equal liberty of expression underlies important
purposes of the first amendment. Three such purposes, not always
distinct in practice, are commonly identified:"8 (1) to permit in-
formed choices by citizens in a self-governing democracy, (2) to aid
in the search for truth, and (3) to permit each person to develop and
exercise his or her capacities, thus promoting the sense of individual
self-worth. As a practical matter, realization of these goals implies
realization of the first amendment's equality principle.
A. Self-government
It was logical for the Declaration of Independence to link the
ideal of political equality with the affirmation that governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Contract
theorists from Locke"6 to Rawls20 have drawn a similar connection,
giving political content to Luther's doctrine of the priesthood of all
believers. If persons are equal, then legitimate government must be
based on the consent of the governed. And if equals consent to be
governed, rational self-interest dictates that each can preserve his
or her own liberty only by agreeing to the equal liberty of all.2'
" The occasion was Justice Black's thirtieth anniversary on the Supreme Court.
" Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 428, 432 (1967).
"1 These purposes are not exhaustive. For example, on another view, the first amendment
serves chiefly as a safety valve, permitting peaceful reform within a stable system-or, as
Herbert Marcuse would have it, preventing revolution through "repressive tolerance." The
function can be seen more positively as one of legitimizing. Chief Justice Warren remarked
in the context of a claim of equal protection:
Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs
or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative govern-
ment.
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); cf. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE
AND THE COURT 34-55 (1960).
1J . LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Book I, ch. VIII, Nos. 95-122 (1690).
RwLS, supra note 2.
21 Id. at 207.
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Consent is thus conditioned on the preservation of equality under
law. In Rousseau's words,
[Tihe social compact establishes among the citizens such an
equality that they all pledge themselves under the same condi-
tions and ought all to enjoy the same rights . .. [T]he sover-
eign never has a right to burden one subject more than another,
because then the matter becomes particular and his power is
no longer competent.22
The principle invoked by Rousseau is not limited to political rights,
but logically extends into the argument advanced by Justice Jack-
son in his justly celebrated concurrence in Railway Express Agency
v. New York:23
There is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the princi-
ples of law which officials would impose upon a minority must
be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no
better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require
that laws be equal in operation.
A general theory of equal protection is thus derived from the con-
tract rationale that earlier generated a theory of equal political par-
ticipation.
Alexander Meiklejohn based his eloquent defense of the free-
dom of political expression on similar reasoning. In Free Speech and
Its Relation to Self-Government,2 Meiklejohn argued that a govern-
ment deriving its legitimacy from the consent of the governed is
based upon "a voluntary compact among political equals"2 5 and
depends for its success on the wisdom of the voters. This wisdom is
to be found "only in the minds of [the self-governing community's]
individual citizens. ' 2 The government, Meiklejohn contended,
must not prevent the community from hearing any ideas relevant
to their task of self-government:
2 J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Book II, ch. IV (Tozer transl. 1902), in F. COKR,
READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILosoPHY 646-47 (rev. ed. 1938).
"336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949).
2 A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). See also
A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLTIcAL FREEDOM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
25 A. MEIKLEJOHN,. FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 11 (1948).
28 Id. at 25.
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Citizens . . .may not be barred [from speaking] because their
views are thought to be false or dangerous. . . .And the reason
for this equality of status in the field of ideas lies deep in the
very foundations of the self-governing process. When [people]
govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass
judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. 27
Insofar as a guarantee of free speech rests on a theory of self-
government, then, the principle of equal liberty of expression is
inherent in that guarantee.
B. The Search for Truth
The suppression of speech necessarily retards society's search
for knowledge. The argument on behalf of the need for unfettered
speech has been stated most eloquently by John Stuart Mill:
Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion
is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for
purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with
human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.2 1
Mill was not only a political philosopher, but also a pioneer of mod-
em social science. His quoted statement reflects the essence of the
scientific method: no hypothesis can be taken as proved in the ab-
sence of attempts to disprove it. The widest freedom to contradict
prevailing opinion is thus implicit in any serious search for truth.29
The advancement of knowledge depends on unfettered competition
between today's prevailing opinions and those opinions that may
come to prevail tomorrow. Preserving competition among ideas
demands protecting the expression of all views, including minority
views, and all speakers, including unpopular ones.
C. Self-expression and Individual Dignity
The interest in voting is fundamental, it is sometimes said,
Id. at 26.
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 207-08 (M.
Cohen ed. 1961). Compare Judge Learned Hand's letter to Justice Holmes in 1918, when the
first amendment was still lying on the constitutional shelf in its original packaging:
Opinions are at best provisional hypotheses, incompletely tested. The more they are
tested, after the tests are well scrutinized, the more assurance we may assume, but they
are never absolutes. So we must be tolerant of opposite opinions or varying opinions by
the very fact of our incredulity of our own.
Document No. 1 in Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modem First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 755 (1975).
" J. MILTON, Areopagitica (1644), in AREOPAGrriCA AND OTHER PROSE WORKS 1, 38 (1927).
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because it is "preservative of all rights."3 But irrespective of any
tangible benefits to be obtained from government through the bal-
lot, voting remains a crucial symbol of citizenship, of membership
in the community. In this sense, racial discrimination in voting
inflicted the same harm as denial of service to blacks at lunch
counters; both served to degrade and humiliate a racial minority.31
Seen in this perspective, the principle of equal liberty of expres-
sion serves the same ends as equality in the right to vote. Each is
necessary not only for the development of the individual's capaci-
ties, but also for the sense of self-respect that comes from being
treated as .a fully participating citizen.
It is no accident that strains on the system of freedom of expres-
sion typically come from the disadvantaged. The boisterous asser-
tiveness of much of the civil rights movement, for example, is trace-
able not only to a need to use the streets and parks as a "public
forum," 32 but more fundamentally to a need for self-assertion simply
as a way of staking a claim to equal citizenship. Equality of expres-
sion is indispensable to a society committed to the dignity of the
individual.
II. THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE
Although the principle of equal liberty of expression is inherent
in the first amendment, it has only recently received full and ex-
plicit articulation in an opinion of the Supreme Court. Fleeting
pronouncements are to be found in some opinions of a generation
ago, 3 and more recently the principle was the basis of an oft-cited
concurring opinion.34 But it was not until 1972, in Police Depart-
ment of the City of Chicago v. Mosely,35 that the Court enunciated
the principle fully. In Mosley, a man who had been picketing peace-
fully near a school, carrying a sign protesting "black discrimina-
tion," sought to enjoin enforcement of a new city ordinance prohib-
iting picketing within 150 feet of a school during school hours; he
" Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886).
"' See generally Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960); C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966). In Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court placed great emphasis on the indignity felt by black
children who were forced to attend segregated schools. Id. at 494.
32 See text and notes at notes 84-110 infra.
' See, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 272 (1951).
11 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring).
I 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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had been advised by the police that he would be arrested if he
continued to picket. The ordinance contained an exception for
"peaceful picketing of any achool involved in a labor dispute." The
Seventh Circuit held the ordinance invalid as an overly broad re-
striction of first amendment rights." The Supreme Court affirmed
but rested its decision on the ground that the ordinance violated the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 31
Mosley squarely addresses the relationship between the equal-
ity principle and the first amendment. Despite the Court's choice
of an equal protection ground for decision, its opinion speaks chiefly
to first amendment values and primarily cites first amendment
cases as authority. In discussing the question of equal opportunity
to be heard, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, observes that
the main problem with the ordinance
is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject
matter. . . . [A]bove all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content ...
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture,
and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are
guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from govern-
ment censorship. The essence of the forbidden censorship is
content control ...
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not
to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not
grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds accepta-
ble, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views. And it may not select which issues
are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is
an "equality of status in the field of ideas" [quoting Meikle-
john38 ] and government must afford all points of view an equal
opportunity to be heard.
Justice Marshall then discusses the level of judicial scrutiny to
be applied when first amendment interests are adversely affected by
an unequal opportunity to be heard:
3, Mosley v. Police Dep't, 432 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1970).
" The Court reached a similar conclusion in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972), decided the same day as Mosley. The Grayned opinion merely cites Mosley, and holds
a similar ordinance invalid on equal protection grounds, without mentioning the first amend-
ment.
See A. MEIKLEJOHN note 25 supra, at 11.
' 408 U.S. at 95-96.
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We have continually recognized that reasonable "time, place
and manner" regulations of picketing may be necessary to fur-
ther significant governmental interests." . . . Similarly, under
an equal protection analysis, there may be sufficient regulatory
interests justifying selective exclusions or distinctions among
pickets. . . . But these justifications for selective exclusions
from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized. Because
picketing plainly involves expressive conduct within the pro-
tection of the First Amendment . . . discriminations among
pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental
interest ...
In this case, the ordinance itself describes impermissible
picketing not in terms of time, place, and manner, but in terms
of subject matter. The regulation "thus slip[s] from the neu-
trality of time, place and circumstances into a concern about
content" [quoting Kalven 1]. This is never permitted.2
Largely ignored by the law reviews,43 Mosley is a landmark first
amendment decision. It makes two principal points: (1) the essence
of the first amendment is its denial to government of the power to
determine which messages shall be heard and which suppressed;
"government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to
be heard." (2) Any "time, place and manner" restriction that selec-
tively excludes speakers from a public forum must survive careful
judicial scrutiny to ensure that the exclusion is the minimum neces-
sary to further a significant government interest. Taken together,
these statements declare a principle of major importance. The
Court has explicitly adopted the principle of equal liberty of expres-
sion.
Adherence to the principle of equal liberty of expression will
have far-reaching implications even though absolute equality is a
practical impossibility. The principle requires courts to start from
the assumption that all speakers and all points of view are entitled
to a hearing, and permits deviation from this basic assumption only
upon a showing of substantial necessity. The emergence of the
equality principle compels a critical re-examination of several lines
40 Citing, inter alia, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 559 (1965).
' Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1,
29.
408 U.S. at 98-99.
'3 Apart from the student note cited in note 7 supra, the only contemporaneous reference
I have found is in 58 A.B.A.J. 1099 (1972). Mosley, however, is now routinely cited by the
Justices and the lower courts. See text at note 241 infra.
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of first amendment decisions. We begin at the heart of the first
amendment, with its prohibition on censorship of speech content.
III. THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE AND CONTENT
DISCRIMINATION
The absence of a clear articulation of the principle of equal
liberty of expression in Supreme Court decisions before Mosley may
be attributable to a belief that the principle is so obviously central
among first amendment values that it requires no explanation. In
Schacht v. United States," for example, a participant in an antiwar
skit was prosecuted under a statute that prohibited wearing an
Army uniform without authorization. The statute contained an ex-
ception allowing the uniform to be worn in a theatrical performance
"if the portrayal does not tend to discredit" the armed forces. Jus-
tice Black, speaking for the Court, found it unnecessary to cite any
authority or offer any explanation for holding that the statutory
exception, "which leaves Americans free to praise the war in Viet-
nam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it,
cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment."4
There is a sense in which we have always known that "unless we
protect [freedom of speech] for all, we will have it for none."4
The equality principle, viewed as a barrier against content cen-
sorship, also implicitly underlies the elaborate first amendment
doctrines that prohibit giving officials discretion to decide when
speech shall be permitted and when it shall be punished or the
speaker denied a license. The danger of delegating such discretion-
" 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
" 398 U.S. at 63; cf. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), in which
the school board had tolerated the wearing of other political symbols, but had forbidden
students to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam war. The restriction was held to be
an unconstitutional content discrimination. But cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), where the Court seemed unable to view a statute that prohibited the burning of draft
cards to be a content discrimination, expressly aimed at suppressing a particular state-
ment-although the First Circuit had seen the point clearly. Perhaps O'Brien could have been
convicted constitutionally for burning his draft card. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study
in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv.
1482, 1496-1500 (1975). But that fact does not excuse the Court from failing to come to grips
with the issue of content discrimination. See Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech
Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 29, 38-42 (1973). Nimmer's discussion of
"overnarrow" legislation is an illuminating application of the first amendment's equality
principle in its most important dimension, as a prohibition on content discrimination.
19 Kalven, supra note 17. In order to uphold the constitutionality of the rest of the
statute, the Court struck the words "if the portrayal does not tend to discredit" from the
actor's exception. 398 U.S. at 63.
19751
The University of Chicago Law Review
ary authority is that a vague licensing 7 or criminal statute 8 would
enable the prosecutor or censor to enforce the law selectively, toler-
ating orthodox views while suppressing unpopular ones. 9 The same
concern underlies decisions imposing rigorous limits on the seizure
of obscene literature."0 It is not accidental that these first amend-
ment doctrines serve equality not only at the level of principle but
also at a practical level, defending nonconformists, dissenters, and
the disadvantaged.5' The principle of equal liberty of expression,
like the equal protection clause, has special relevance for protecting
the downtrodden.
Given the centrality of the equality principle as a protection
against content censorship, it seems likely that the Supreme Court
will eventually complete the job of dismantling what Harry Kalven
termed the "two-level" theory of speech.52 According to this theory,
which sprang from an unguarded dictum in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,53 certain kinds of speech content, such as obscenity,
libel, or "fighting words," lie outside the protection of the first
amendment and may be banned without judicial scrutiny of the
state's justification. Kalven destroyed the intellectual foundations
of the two-level theory as early as 1960, in his classic analysis of the
law of obscenity. 4 He argued that the two-level theory not only
begged the crucial question of formulating a constitutional test for
obscenity, but made judicial categorization dispositive without de-
fining the categories adequately. More importantly, he observed
that the two-level theory, by reading obscenity out of the first
amendment because it lacks "redeeming social importance," vio-
47 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
,' See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
, A similar concern is surely reflected in decisions like Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965) and Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), insofar as they involve the
"hostile audience" problem. If the duty of the police in such a situation is to protect the
speaker as long as they can, part of the reason must be to avoid letting the police decide to
stop the speaker because of disagreement with his or her views. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951), decided the same day as Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), is curiously
insensitive to this concern. Cf. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring): "[U]nder our democratic system of government, lawmaking is not entrusted to
the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat."
50 E.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
11 Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (vague vagrancy ordinance
especially dangerous because of the likelihood of selective enforcement against "poor people,
nonconformists, dissenters, idlers").
Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 10.
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
', Kalven, supra note 52, at 19.
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lates the first amendment principle that prohibits weighing the so-
cial utility of speech.
The two-level theory is radically inconsistent with the principle
of equal liberty of expression. While the equality principle in the
first amendment does not prohibit all content regulation, it does
require that courts start with a presumptive prohibition against
governmental control of the content of speech. A showing of high
probability of serious harm might justify regulation of a particular
kind of speech content, but the two-level theory evades the question
of justification by placing certain types of speech outside the scope
of the first amendment. In other words, the two-level theory rejects
the principle of equality in the marketplace of ideas.5
In the field of defamation, the Court has already gone far to-
ward abandoning the two-level theory. No one would suggest that
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan56 and its diverse offspring 7 leave
libel outside the boundaries of protected speech.58 And even the
"fighting words" cases have fought their way out of the confines of
the two-level theory, coming to rest on a variety of the clear-and-
present-danger test.59 But loyalty to the two-level theory is curiously
persistent. Chief Justice Burger surely had the two-level theory in
mind when he added a brief concurring opinion in Mosley, express-
ing his reservations about the sweep of the Court's adoption of the
principle of equal liberty of expression:
Numerous holdings of this Court attest to the fact that the
First Amendment does not literally mean that we "are guaran-
The debate between "balancers" and "categorizers" is a long, long tunnel, without
apparent end. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 45, at 1500-02. Kalven's discussion of the two-level
theory, supra note 52, was and remains a salutary reminder of the dangers that the first
amendment can be "categorized away" as well as "balanced away."
58 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Kalven, supra note 10.
57 E.g., the law of privacy; see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Nimmer, The Right
to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel & Misapplied to
Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968); and libel of "public figures," Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and persons swept up in matters of public interest, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
m There may remain a last ditch for the two-level theory in the case of the "purely
private" libel of this general style: "Lady Cynthia should not marry Cadwallader; in India
he cheated at cards." And even where the New York Times rule applies, it is still possible to
say that libel published with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity is beneath the
concern of the first amendment. To put the matter this way is to show how far the Court has
gone in bringing libel back into the amendment's shelter.
" See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); cf. Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S.
913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). The Court continues to use the two-level language, but
has limited the reach of the "fighting words" exception to cases in which both the statute
and the defendant's conduct pass the test of a "direct tendency" to cause violence.
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teed the right to express any thought, free from government
censorship." This statement is subject to some qualifications,
as for example those of Roth v. United States [obscenity],
• . . [and] Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire [fighting words]
... . See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan [wilfully or
recklessly false libel] .... 60
The Chief Justice recognized a crucial truth: the two-level theory
cannot survive rigorous application of the first amendment's equal-
ity principle.
In the obscenity cases, the Court continues to say that "obscene
material is unprotected by the First Amendment.""t Yet even in
these cases the two-level theory is weakening. Justice Brennan, who
fostered this child of the two-level theory, has now abandoned it."
Furthermore, despite the Court's effort to decentralize the critical
decision of what is "obscene material" by deferring to the local
community-i. e., the jury"3-the Court itself must continue to po-
lice at least the borderland of obscenity. Thus, the impact of the
two-level theory will be deflected. Not only will speech determined
by the jury to be nonobscene be constitutionally protected, but
certain speech that is obscene in the jury's view will be brought
within the scope of the first amendment's protection. Even if many
local, decisions are effectively final, surely some prosecutor will go
after the movie, "Carnal Knowledge," some jury will find it ob-
scene, and the Court will feel compelled to intervene in order to
protect the film. 4
In the long run the Court seems likely, in defining obscenity,
to return to the guidelines it was beginning to develop before 1973
for justifying censorship: concern over the exposure of children or
unwilling "captive audiences" to explicit sex-related material and
concern over the commercial exploitation of sexual anxieties. 5
Speech that is "obscene" will not be banished from all first amend-
ment shelter, but will be subject to restriction upon a showing of
serious harmful effects. The two-level theory is alive in the obscen-
ity area, but it is not well.
408 U.S. at 103.
" Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
42 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-93 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
'3 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).
" Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). The Court relied upon the procedural require-
ments of Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), in order to avoid a similar rule as
to the possible obscenity of the musical "Hair." In so doing it made some welcome new law
on the constitutional limits on a city in its role as proprietor of an auditorium. See text at
note 82 infra; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
Is See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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One last area where an offspring of the two-level theory sur-
vived longer than it deserved is the area of advertising and "com-
mercial speech."6 Valentine v. Chrestensen7 seemed to place com-
mercial speech in general beyond constitutional protection. Despite
occasional murmurs of discontent with such a categorical exclu-
sion, 8 the shadow of that decision darkened a comer of the first
amendment until very recently. 9
Just last term, however, in Bigelow v. Virginia,0 the Court
invalidated a Virginia law that prohibited any advertisement en-
couraging the procuring of an abortion. The advertisement in ques-
tion told Virginia readers how to obtain an abortion in New York
and thus proposed the sale of a service. But that fact alone was held
insufficient to remove the advertisement from the protection of the
first amendment." Bigelow confined the unfortunate decision in
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,7 two years ago, to cases in which advertisements propose
unlawful commercial transactions. Most important, the Court ex-
pressly laid to rest the notion that Chrestensen created a new
branch of the two-level theory for commercial speech or advertising.
The abortion advertisement, said the Court,
did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It
contained factual material of clear "public interest."73
This subject was a blind spot for Alexander Meiklejohn, who was perfectly willing to
read the whole area out of the first amendment, including broadcasting, which he saw as "not
engaged in the task of enlarging and enriching human communication," but rather as "en-
gaged in making money." A. MEKLEJOHN, supra note 25, at 104.
'7 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
OS Especially in the lower courts. See generally Redish, The First Amendment in the
Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
429, 448-72 (1971). See also Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1005, 1027-38 (1967); Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv.
L. Rav. 1191 (1965).
"1 E.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
384-85 (1973); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-15 (1959) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
70 95 S. Ct. 2222 (1975).
1, Since the advertisement did not encourage the procurement of abortions that were
then illegal in Virginia, it could not have been suppressed under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
72 413 U.S. 376 (1973). In Pittsburgh Press, a bare majority of the Court relied on
Chrestensen to reject a first amendment attack on an ordinance that had been construed to
forbid newspapers from carrying help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated columns ex-
cept where based upon a bona fide occcupational qualification.
73 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2232 (1975). See also Population Services Int'l v.VWilson, 398 F. Supp.
321, 336-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (statute banning advertisement of contraceptive products is
invalid).
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Thus the Court turned to the particulars of the speech before it and
to the alleged justifications for suppression-justifications that
could scarcely survive Roe v. Wade.74 In other contexts, this analysis
would be called "strict scrutiny," and any scrutiny of justifications
is inconsistent with the theory that a category of speech lies com-
pletely outside the first amendment's boundaries.75
Unfortunately, a doctrinal offshoot of the two-level theory in
commercial speech cases has recently taken root. In Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights,'7 the Court upheld, by a 4-1-4 vote, a city transit
system's rule that allowed commercial advertising in its cars but
forbade political advertising. As the four dissenting Justices natu-
rally thought, the case was a perfect occasion for applying the
Mosley principle of equality, since the only distinction between per-
mitted and forbidden advertising turned on the advertising's con-
tent.77 The three Justices who joined in Justice Blackmun's plurality
opinion, however, contrived to ignore the first amendment's equal-
ity principle altogether by reasoning that the city was not operating
a public forum but was "engaged in commerce. ' 78 Its decision to
exclude political advertising was therefore perceived to be "little
different from deciding to impose a 10-, 25-, or 35-cent fare, or from
changing schedules or the location of bus stops. ' 79 Requiring the city
to accept political advertising, said Justice Blackmun, would mean
not only that transit riders "would be subjected to the blare of
political propaganda," but also that "display cases in public hospi-
tals, libraries, office buildings, military compounds, and other pub-
lic facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every
would-be pamphleteer and politician."8
74 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Is To say that the first amendment applies to commercial speech is not to deny the
validity of the regulation of false advertising. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive
Advertising, supra note 68. But an awareness of first amendment values in such cases is an
improvement over uncritical acceptance of a two-level theory in this area. For an expression
of such first amendment concerns, see Chief Judge Fairchild's concurring opinion in FTC v.
National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485, 49"0 (7th Cir. 1975). See also Terry v.
California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975), holding invalid state
statutes prohibiting the advertising of retail prices of prescription drugs and forbidding any
representation that such a drug is sold at a discount price. For a rather more restrictive view
of the first amendment values-in advertising cases, see Kozyris, Advertising Intrusion: As-
sault on the Senses, Trespass on the Mind-A Remedy Through Separation, 36 OHIo ST.
L.J. 299, 308-13 (1975). This article was written before the Bigelow decision.
76 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
7 Id. at 315-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 303.
11 Id. at 304.
10 Id. at 305-08. Justice Douglas, whose concurrence was necessary to create a majority,
relied almost entirely on the argument that bus riders are a captive audience. 418 U.S. at
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This closing rhetoric about hospital display cases and the like
utterly misses the point of the dissent's content-discrimination ar-
gument. It assumes that the only question is whether there is a
constitutional right to use a bus as a public political forum. 1 Bus
riders will be barraged by unwanted advertisements in any case, but
neither the plurality nor Justice Douglas ever explained why a polit-
ical barrage is more offensive than a commercial one. This failure
to consider the first amendment's equality principle is particularly
inexcusable in view of the dissent's careful development of the
theme. Worse, the comparison between forbidding political adver-
tising and setting bus fares forebodes the development of yet an-
other branch of the discredited two-level theory. It suggests that the
city should be treated in its proprietary role as largely beyond the
reach of the first amendment-a position the Court wisely rejected
less than a year later, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.2
In short, the plurality opinion in Lehman fails the test of craftsman-
ship as well as the test of good sense, offering instead an idea whose
time has come and gone.
Just as the prohibition of government-imposed discrimination
on the basis of race is central to equal protection analysis, protection
against governmental discrimination on the basis of speech content
is central among first amendment values. Equal protection analysis
has long understood that governmental action may be neutral on its
face and yet have unequal impacts. Similarly, regulations that are
formally neutral as to speech content may produce the effect of
content discrimination. 3 Such regulations will be analyzed in light
of the first amendment's principle of equal liberty of expression.
IV. HIDDEN INEQUALITIES: OF PUBLIC FORUMS AND PRIVATE
HARASSMENT
It was Harry Kalven who coined the term "public forum," now
a commonplace of first amendment discourse. Ten years ago, in
306-08. Unless the riders are contortionists, it is hard to see how this argument applies to ads
carried on the outside of the buses.
SI Justice Douglas makes the same assumption in his concurring opinion. Even if the
content-discrimination issue were eliminated from Lehman, the majority's treatment of the
public forum issue was inadequate. See Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974
Sup. CT. REV. 233, 256-61, 278-80; Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, EqualAccess,
and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975).
- 420 U.S. 546 (1975). The Conrad opinion was written by Justice Blackmun, who did
not advert to his opinion in Lehman except to note in passing that there was no captive
audience problem when patrons chose to go to a municipal auditorium to see "Hair."
0 See also note 45 supra (the discussion of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
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analyzing Cox v. Louisiana,4 he offered the first full articulation of
the theory of the public forum. It is fitting to let him introduce the
theory in his own words:
[I]n an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and
other public places are an important facility for public discus-
sion and political process. They are in brief a public forum that
the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with
which such facilities are made available is an index of free-
dom. . . . [W]hat is required is in effect a set of Robert's
Rules of Order for the new uses of the public forum, albeit the
designing of such rules poses a problem of formidable practical
difficulty.85
All would agree that government can place reasonable and content-
neutral restrictions on the time, place and manner of a citizen's
commandeering of the public forum. What made Mosley and
Lehman easy cases-the outrage of Lehman being that it was an
easy case, wrongly decided-was that in restricting the use of pick-
eting and bus advertising the cities did not merely regulate the time,
place or manner of speech, but imposed discriminatory controls over
the content of speech.
Regulations of the public forum often collide with the equality
principle, viewed as a protection against discrimination based on
speech content. Many of the licensing decisions aimed at avoiding
discriminatory content censorship arose in the public forum con-
text.86 Indeed, one of the Supreme Court's earliest allusions to the
first amendment equality principle came in a park-licensing case,
Niemotko v. Maryland, 7 in which the practice of dispensing public
park meeting permits on the basis of the religious beliefs of the
applicants was held unconstitutional. Public forum cases implicitly
rely on the equality principle to protect against what might be
called de jure content discrimination.
But the public forum cases also touch the equality principle in
two other related ways. First, even a formally content-neutral time,
place and manner restriction may have unequal effects on various
types of messages. The resulting inequality may be constitutionally
unacceptable, whether or not the discrimination is intended. Sec-
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
'5 Kalven, supra note 41, at 11-12. See also H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 123-60 (1965).
E.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
- 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
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ond, the very concept of the public forum is based in large part on
the first amendment equality principle's central concern with avoid-
ing content censorship.
Suppose, for example, that the ordinance in Mosley had not
contained the labor-picketing exception, but had banned all picket-
ing within 150 feet of a school during school hours in order to avoid
disruption of the school. The burden of this restriction would fall
most heavily on those who have something to communicate to the
school population of students, faculty and staff. Student picketers
presenting a grievance against a principal, or striking custodians
with a message growing out of a labor dispute, would be affected
more seriously by this ostensibly content-neutral ordinance than
would, say, the proponents of a candidate for Governor. The latter
might spend their time just as effectively by carrying their signs and
message to any similarly populous area, while the students or cus-
todians will find it hard to transmit their messages to their intended
audience if they cannot picket near the school. This differential
impact amounts to de facto content discrimination, presumptively
invalid under the first amendment's equality principle.88
City council members are thus presented with an apparent di-
lemma. 9 If a city bars all picketing within a certain area, it will
effectively discriminate against those groups that can communicate
to their audience only by picketing within that area. But if the city
adjusts its ordinance to this differential impact, as by providing a
student-picketing or labor-picketing exemption, it discriminates
between the messages of different groups on the basis of content.
u In this dimension, the first amendment's equality principle may be more far-reaching
than the equal protection clause in its present application to de facto racial discrimination.
At the moment, the Supreme Court is divided over the question of the presumptive invalidity
of legislation having racially discriminatory effects. The issue was avoided in Keyes v. School
Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973), where the Court found deliberate official action to maintain school
segregation in Denver. In one view, of course, there is no "discrimination" in racial imbalance
alone, absent intentional action to cause it. A more extreme position is that in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), rejecting the
argument that a state welfare scheme was invalid because of its racially discriminatory
results. In the long run, the odds are that the Court will adopt the view of Justice Powell,
concurring in Keyes, 413 U.S. at 217, that the de facto-de jure distinction should be aban-
doned in favor of a rule requiring justification for official action that has racially discrimina-
tory effects.
" The dilemma is analogous to that faced by courts in accommodating the competing
demands of the first amendment's two religion clauses. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), which posed the question: is South Carolina constitutionally forbidden by the
establishment clause to allow an exception for Seventh Day Adventists in administering its
unemployment compensation scheme, or is it constitutionally required by the free exercise
clause to do so? (Answer: the latter).
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Such an ordinance would run afoul of Mosley itself. The city can
avoid the dilemma by amending the ordinance to ban not all picket-
ing but only noisy picketing.2
Another problem raised by the hypothetical ordinance banning
all picketing is that it is unconstitutionally overbroad; it is not
narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest in permitting
school activities to go on without interruption. The doctrine of over-
breadth frequently serves the purposes of the first amendment's
equality principle. One of the evils of an overly broad statute is its
potential for selective enforcement." Police who look charitably on
a postgame victory celebration in the streets of a college town may
not feel the same way about an antiwar demonstration. Similarly,
statutes proscribing abusive words are applied to members of racial
and political minorities more frequently than can be wholly ex-
plained by any special proclivity of those people to speak abu-
sively. 2 Although vigorous application of the overbreadth doctrine
cannot eliminate the danger of selective enforcement, it can mini-
mize the danger by restricting the occasions for enforcement.
More typically, however, the overbreadth doctrine will be used
in tandem with the first amendment equality principle. The equal-
ity principle can be employed first, to give Justice Jackson's
Railway Express theory 3 a chance to operate. If eliminating excep-
tions and making the law apply generally should result in increasing
the total restriction on speech,94 the overbreadth principle can be
used as a countervailing force. As in the hypothetical case of the
ordinance that was amended to ban all picketing in order to cure
the taint caused by the labor-picketing exceptions, 5 the resulting
"dilemma" will force the legislature to draft a law that is, in equal
protection terms, neither underinclusive nor overinclusive 5 The
90 Such an ordinance was upheld in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972),
the companion case to Mosley. As Grayned shows, this type of ordinance is apt to present a
vagueness problem, too.
" See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 844, 857 n.55
(1970).
92 See, e.g., the trio of per curiam decisions, Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972);
Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); and Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); cf.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which the offending epithet was addressed to the
draft.
" 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
11 This was just what happened in the City of Rockford; after Grayned was arrested and
convicted, the labor-picketing exception was repealed. 408 U.S. at 107 n.2.
' See text at note 89 supra.
" See Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341,
344-48 (1949). In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 95 S. Ct. 2268 (1975), a first amendment
case discussed in the text at note 236 infra, Justice Douglas, concurring, said, "I join whole-
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equality principle guards against the unequal treatment resulting
from underinclusion; the overbreadth principle guards against the
hidden inequalities and selective enforcement resulting from overin-
clusion.
The remedy for a time, place and manner regulation that has
a selectively harsh impact on a particular group or message,
therefore, is not necessarily the direct application of the equality
principle. 7 But a showing that a formally neutral law has discrimi-
natory effect deserves great weight in persuading a court to look
closely at the necessity for the regulation-in other words, to apply
the overbreadth principle rigorously. 8 As in the case of a law ban-
ning all picketing near a school, the disproportionate burden borne
by striking school employees may not be necessary to achieve the
state's purpose of preventing disruptions in school; a law banning
noisy picketing is more closely tailored to that goal.
Furthermore, the equality principle cautions us not to take the
notion of a Robert's Rule of Order too literally as a measure of
permissible restriction of the public forum. The formal equality of
"content-neutral" procedural rules, like that of the statute banning
all picketing, may conceal a hidden inequality. The difficulty in
analogizing the public forum to a parliamentary forum escaped even
Alexander Meiklejohn:
The First Amendment. . .is not the guardian of unregu-
lated talkativeness. It does not require that, on every occasion,
every citizen shall take part in public debate. Nor can it even
give assurance that everyone shall have opportunity to do so.
If, for example, at a town meeting, twenty like-minded citizens
have become a "party," and if one of them has read to the
meeting an argument which they have all approved, it would
be ludicrously out of order for each of the others to insist on
reading it again. No competent moderator would tolerate that
wasting of the time available for free discussion. What is essen-
tial is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth
saying shall be said."
heartedly in the Court's view that the ordinance in issue here is fatally overinclusive in some
respects and fatally underinclusive in others."
But see the political privacy cases discussed in the text at note 111 infra.
" The Court has implied that the overbreadth doctrine retains its full vigor, even after
the dilution implicit in the term "substantial overbreadth," in a case involving "a censorial
statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoints." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
616 (1973).
" A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 25, at 25.
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Meiklejohn's rather strained example does not even typify the ex-
pression in town meetings, let alone the sort of freewheeling expres-
sion characteristic of debate in the public forum. But Meiklejohn is
wrong in a more fundamental way. The state lacks "moderators"
who can be trusted to know when "everything worth saying" has
been said, and the legislature lacks the capacity to write laws that
will tell a moderator when to make such a ruling. And even the
repetition of speech conveys the distinctive message that an opinion
is widely shared. The impression of a mounting consensus is of great
importance in an "other-directed" society ' ° where opinion polls are
self-fulfilling prophecies. A vital public forum requires a principle
of equal liberty of expression that is broad, protecting speakers as
well as ideas.
A city council bent on squelching the expression of minority
views could, of course, attempt to achieve its aim by "distinguishing
not between users but between uses.""'' The council might, for ex-
ample, pass a law banning all picketing. The chief criticism of the
Court's reliance on the equality principle in Mosley was that the city
arguably could equalize speech through wholesale restriction.0 2 But
the first amendment equality principle itself underlies the public
forum concept. Limitations on the modes of expression in the public
forum-hidden discrimination-may undermine that principle and
thus subvert the notion of a truly public forum. Harry Kalven sum-
marized the point gracefully:
In the Jehovah's Witness cases, the Court had been out-
spokenly sensitive to the "poor man's printing press" 10 3 theme.
Labor picketing apart, perhaps, the parade, the picket, the
leaflet, the sound truck, have been the media of communica-
tion exploited by those with little access to the more genteel
means of communication. We would do well to avoid the occa-
sion for any new epigrams about the majestic equality of the
law prohibiting the rich man, too, from distributing leaflets or
picketing.0 4
Even assuming the correctness of Meiklejohn's limited view of
the equality principle-that what is important is "that everything
' See D. RIEsmAN, N. GLAZER & R. DENNEY, THE LONELY CROWD 23 passim (1950).
11 T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 304.
"0 Note, supra note 7, at 476-77.
"I The reference is to Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 146 (1943), a case involving distribution of door-to-door circulars, in which he called
such activity "essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."
,"I Kalven, supra note 41, at 30 (footnote omitted).
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worth saying shall be said""' 5-it must be recognized that the con-
tent of the messages carried by leafleters and pickets is apt to differ
significantly from the content of the daily press and the broadcast
media. Thus the equality principle itself requires the most generous
definition of the boundaries of the public forum in order to ensure
that all will be heard. Concededly, the city has a compelling interest
in protecting school activity from material disruption.106 But if it
seeks to attain this end by means that diminish the area of the
public forum, as by restricting picketing near a school, it must show
that those means are necessary to achieve that compelling interest.
A general ban on picketing will not survive such a test.
Content discrimination, whether overt or hidden, also must not
be allowed to infect the definition of the limits of the public forum.
The shopping-center cases are an unhappy example of just such a
violation of the equality principle. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,"°' anti-
war leafleters were held to have no right to distribute their handbills
in a 50-acre privately-owned shopping center. The majority
distinguished Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc.,'" which had accorded a shopping-center the same "pub-
lic forum" status that Marsh v. Alabama ' had given a company
town. In Logan Valley, the Lloyd Corp. majority said, the first
amendment activity had been "related to the shopping center's op-
erations," since it consisted of union picketing of a supermarket in
the center for the purpose of achieving collective bargaining recogni-
tion. By contrast, in Lloyd Corp., the antiwar leafleters might as
well have distributed their handbills elsewhere."'
Lloyd Corp. and Mosley, decided four days apart, thus produce
this extraordinary net result: a labor-picketing exception in an ordi-
nance is unconstitutional, but in a "private" shopping center a
labor-picketing exception is constitutionally required. The nation
deserves better than this, and the first amendment's equality prin-
ciple demands better.
Some years before the term "public forum" entered the first
amendment lexicon, the Supreme Court faced another kind of hid-
IN A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 25, at 25.
,o Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). The "material disruption" standard
is formulated in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., supra note 45, 393 U.S. at 512-14.
407 U.S. 551 (1972).
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Cf. Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975)
(access to farmworkers living in a residential community operated by employer held governed
by Marsh rather than Lloyd Corp.).
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den "classification" produced by legislation that was formally
content-neutral. In the late 1950s, when the civil rights movement
was gathering momentum in the South, public disclosure of one's
membership in the NAACP typically was followed by annoyances
like threats and midnight phone calls, and often by more tangible
reprisals like being fired. In a series of cases, the Court held that
state and local governments could not constitutionally insist on
such disclosure, either by the NAACP itself' or by individual
members.112
The governments' demands for information in these cases
usually were presented for ostensibly neutral purposes. The State of
Alabama discovered that it needed the NAACP's membership list
in order to determine whether the Association had violated the
state's foreign-corporation laws."' The State of Arkansas found it
necessary to inquire into the organizational affiliations of its school
teachers since some teachers might be spending too much time on
outside activities."' The Court, solemnly going along with the gag,
took these asserted justifications at face value but concluded none-
theless that the required disclosures unconstitutionally invaded first
amendment rights of political association. The Court noted the se-
verity of the private harassment that tended to result from disclo-
sure and held, on the strength of that probable effect, that these
facially neutral laws were invalid."'
The Court's concern in these cases grows out of the first amend-
ment's equality principle. If all the school teachers in Arkansas were
to disclose their respective memberships in organizations, it is a safe
bet that most Rotarians and Job's Daughters would not be greeted
with heavy breathing when they answered the phone at night. The
private harassment that concerned the Court was reserved for those
associated with an unpopular challenge to the local orthodoxy. The
point here is not simply that first amendment liberties normally
matter most to underdogs; it is also that these decisions parallel one
'" Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
I Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See generally H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 65-121 (1965).
,, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
,,4 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
,, The Court had been far less hospitable to claims of political privacy in earlier cases
dealing with the exposure of Communist Party membership. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); cf. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961). We can hope that Harry Kalven was right in predicting
that "we may come to see the Negro as winning back for us the freedoms the Communists
seemed to have lost for us." H. KALVEN, supra note 112, at 6.
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type of solution to the "state action" problem that historically has
plagued efforts to use the equal protection clause to protect individ-
uals against private racial discimination. In the disclosure cases, the
state is seen as "encouraging" private discrimination against those
who espouse ideas with a particular content, even though the en-
couragement is embodied in a formally neutral law.'
V. EQUALITY AND THE STOPPING-PLACE PROBLEM: THE
ISSUE OF ACCESS TO THE MEDIA
From the perspective of the first amendment's equality princi-
ple, the public forum cases lead us to a far more intractable prob-
lem: the issue of a right to access to the press and the broadcast
media. No one would seriously argue that picketing and leafleting
are as effective as newspapers and broadcasting in communicating
messages." 7 Does the equality principle mean that there is a consti-
tutional right of access not merely to the metaphorical "poor per-
son's printing press" but to the press itself, so that each person's
message may be communicated with equal effectiveness?
The first amendment speaks not of access but of freedom. The
argument for a first amendment right of access thus appears to
place "First Amendment values" ahead of the amendment itself."61
But "equality of status in the field of ideas""' is not merely a first
amendment value; it is the heart of the first amendment. The
media-access cases are problematical not because they require a
choice between equality and freedom, but because both equality
and freedom are to be found on either side of the argument.'2 '
In any case, the constitutional values of equality and liberty are
fundamentally linked by the notion that equal access to certain
" Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
,, See Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1641, 1647 (1967). But cf. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections
on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 769-71 (1972). The point is not so much that
the press or the broadcast media convert people, as that they reinforce the conventional
wisdom. See Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade: Acces to Radio and
Television, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 723, 739-41 (1972).
"S See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
145-46 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). But see Justice Stewart's approving reference to an
opinion's emphasis of "First Amendment values," Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 437 n.14
(1971).
" A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 25, at 6.
' On the side of the media owners, the equality principle argues against government
regulation favoring or disfavoring speech because of its content. A guarantee of access to a
medium not only reduces the owner's freedom, but replaces the owner's message with another
imposed by the government. On the other side, those who seek access to the media typically
invoke the equality principle as a means of exercising their freedom in ways that are effective.
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institutions and services is a prime component of any meaningful
liberty. This link is reflected in the language of egalitarian move-
ments. The civil rights movement of the 1960s, for example,
marched under the banner of "Freedom" even though its chief
objective was equal access-to the vote, to education, to housing,
even to lunch counters. "Liberation" is today a theme of more than
rhetorical significance in egalitarian causes such as the women's
movement. Access and freedom are in no sense antithetical ideas.
Yet the Supreme Court has posed the media-access issue in just
such absolutist terms. The Court has recognized the problem cre-
ated by increasingly centralized private power over the press121 and
the heretofore inherent limits on the number of licensed broadcast-
ers.' 2  But despite the strong public interest in some guarantee of
access, the Court has tended to assume that nothing can be done
without abandoning the first amendment principle of freedom from
government coercion. When the Court is confronted by a statute
guaranteeing access to the press, the admonition of Zechariah Cha-
fee, Jr. is wheeled into position and fired:
Liberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries
to compel what is to go into a newspaper. '23
And the FCC's fairness doctrine, according to Justice Douglas,
puts the head of the camel inside the tent and enables adminis-
tration after administration to toy with TV or radio in order to
serve its sordid or its benevolent ends.12 4
It is a familiar argument in the equal protection context that
once government imposes an affirmative duty to equalize, such a
policy finds no principled "stopping-place," but instead tends to
dissolve all the limits by which the Court seeks to contain it. And
soon, to use Justice Douglas's metaphor, the whole camel is in the
tent. Whenever the Supreme Court extends the affirmative duty of
government to protect against inequalities resulting from private
2, See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-51 (1974), which
held unconstitutional a Florida statute that imposed a "right-to-reply" obligation on news-
papers despite the Court's recognition of the tendency toward press monopoly.
'2 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-
02 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Developments like cable television raise the possibility that the
scarcity of broadcast channels may be a passing problem.
"n 2 Z. CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947), quoted in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 n.24, 261 (1974) (opinions of Burger, C.J.
and White, J.).
"24 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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discrimination, the stopping-place problem is sure to be raised by
the dissent.' When the first amendment's equality principle began
to generate affirmative-duty issues, it was thus predictable that
claims of a constitutional right of access to the media would elicit a
similar response: how can any right of access be constructed without
turning the communications media into "passive receptacle[s] or
conduit[s] for news, comment, and advertising"?126 The principle
of equal liberty of expression offers a perspective and a direction for
constitutional growth, but does not define its own limits.'2 "Once
loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined."'2
Like many equal protection issues, the media-access problem
should be approached from two separate constitutional directions.
First, what does the Constitution compel government to do in the
way of equalizing? Second, what does the Constitution permit gov-
ernment to do in equalizing by statute? The first question is raised
by Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee2 9 and the second by Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC30 and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.'3' The
stopping-place problem is conceptually much harder in the first
type of case, but, as Chafee and the camel remind us, it is also
present in the second.
The Supreme Court has relied mainly on two doctrinal devices
to contain the affirmative duties imposed by the equal protection
clause: the "state action" limitation'3 2 and a permissive form of
"rational basis" judicial review. The CBS case demonstrates that
both of these devices are of little help in resolving a constitutional
claim of access to the broadcast media.
'12 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-63 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
'' Frank Michelman has proposed a theory of "minimum protection" as a way of resolv-
ing the stopping-place problem inherent in claims to equality by persons who cannot afford
to pay for various goods and services. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAv. L. REv. 7 (1969). By
analogy, leafleting, picketing, and the like might be regarded as an adequate minimum
opportunity to communicate, making access to the press and the broadcast media constitu-
tionally unnecessary. For some of the purposes of freedom of expression, such a minimum
protection theory seems sufficient, i.e., self-realization and dignity, the safety valve function,
and perhaps even the search for truth. A minimum protection approach to speech seems less
helpful, however, in informing the citizenry in a self-governing society.
In Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966).
' 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
' 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
131 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
"2 In the context of the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the term "governmen-
tal action" is used.
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In CBS, the Court held that a licensed broadcaster who satisfies
the fairness doctrine'33 has no constitutional obligation1 34 to sell time
for editorial advertisements. The opinion of the Court rested pri-
marily on the first amendment freedoms of the broadcaster. But the
Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist also concluded
that the conduct of a broadcaster was not subject to any constitu-
tional limit since it did not constitute "governmental action. '' 3
That conclusion, while it has some respectable roots in state action
theory, seems quite wrong. Furthermore, it was unnecessary to
make this argument at all; the considerations relied on by the Chief
Justice seem far more relevant to resolving the constitutional mer-
its.
There are good reasons for concluding that the conduct of a
broadcaster is susceptible to some constitutional limitation. A
broadcaster is licensed by government not merely to do business,
but to use a publicly owned resource. During the period of the li-
cense, the broadcaster enjoys a quasi-monopolistic power enforced
by government. The broadcaster is subject to detailed and compre-
hensive regulation of its activities, including the supervision of pro-
gram content and the obligations imposed by the fairness doctrine.
These limitations encourage the very policy choice made by the
broadcasters in the CBS case, to refuse editorial advertising.'36 If a
licensed broadcaster had refused to employ black news reporters,
there is little doubt that even the three named Justices would have
characterized the broadcaster's conduct as governmental action,
subject to the Constitution's commands.' 37 What made the differ-
See text at note 147 infra.
' Nor any obligation under the governing statutes.
' 412 U.S. at 119-21. Justice Douglas, who concurred, assumed in a rather strained way
that a broadcast licensee's action was not "governmental action." He was troubled by his own
previous opinions arguing that other kinds of governmental licensing amount to "state ac-
tion." 412 U.S. at 149-50; e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (dis-
senting); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 183-85 (1961) (concurring).
,31 Not only does the FCC supervise compliance with the fairness doctrine by reviewing
licensees' applications for renewal every three years, but it also investigates individual com-
plaints. Furthermore, as the editors of the Harvard Law Review pointed out, the FCC has
ruled that licensees must themselves bear the cost of presenting opposing views on controver-
sial issues when paid sponsors are not available; as a result, broadcasters are encouraged to
fill their advertising time with noncontroversial commercial material and thus avoid
fairness doctrine responsibilities that might impinge on their programming decisions or
reduce their revenues.
Note, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 181-82 (1973). The FCC has
reduced the impact of the fairness doctrine on paid "commercials," applying it only to those
"devoted in an obvious and meaningful way to. . .public issues." 39 Fed. Reg. 26372, 26374;
see Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975).
'17 This constitutional issue presumably will not arise so long as federal civil rights laws
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ence in CBS for these Justices was the weight of the broadcaster's
own constitutional freedom.
If the state action doctrine is to be retained,"' the interest of
private individuals to act arbitrarily in exercising their own free-
doms ought to be considered in deciding whether there is "signifi-
cant state involvement" in private action.' Although government
has no legitimate interest in the freedom to act arbitrarily, an indi-
vidual does and should be accorded constitutional leeway in some
situations in which the state itself would be restricted. A number
of state action decisions have properly taken this distinction into
account.14 0 But there is another dimension to the state action prob-
lem, a dimension unduly minimized by the three Justices in CBS
who found no governmental action. A government's action also dif-
fers from individual action in its consequences. The action of an
individual rarely affects large interests or large numbers of people,
but governmental actions typically have broad impact.' A licensed
broadcaster's connections with government are not mere formali-
ties; governmental policy permeates everything the broadcaster
does. The pervasive influence of government policy on the individ-
ual broadcaster is wholly in keeping with the notion that the broad-
caster performs a function that has a broad societal impact. Absent
a delegation of the power to use the public airwaves, government
itself might well perform the broadcasting function, as it does in
many other countries.
Fortunately, a majority of the CBS Court did not support the
proposition that a licensed broadcaster's advertising policy is
insufficiently involved with government to justify application of the
Constitution to the broadcaster. Two concurring Justices recognized
that the Court did not have to distort state action doctrine in order
to protect broadcasters. Rather, the Court could give weight to the
broadcaster's first amendment freedom in resolving the merits of
the would-be advertisers' claimed right to access. Despite the as-
sumptions of Justices Douglas and Stewart,"' a finding of govern-
prohibit such racial discrimination in hiring. But the issue seems an easy one.
138 Cf. Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition
14, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 H.Anv. L. REV. 69 (1967); Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. Rav. 208 (1957).
"I For the view that this individual interest is not relevant to the question of governmen-
tal action, but only to the first amendment claim of the broadcaster, see Note, The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, supra note 136, at 181.
"I The theme is developed in some detail in Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN.
L. REV. 3 (1961).
141 Id.
,42 Each wrote a separate concurring opinion.
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mental action does not convert the broadcaster into an agency of the
government, or even a public utility; the broadcaster retains some
freedom to act arbitrarily in the exercise of its constitutional rights.
The state action doctrine may have other problems, but it does not
pose an all-or-nothing choice in bringing the Constitution to bear on
private conduct.
The state action limitation, then, offers no easy solution to the
stopping-place problem presented by a claim of constitutional right
of access to the broadcast media. The claim must be assessed on the
constitutional merits; and on the merits, constitutional principle
does not speak with one voice. On the one hand, the first amend-
ment's equality principle strongly suggests the importance of afford-
ing a forum to a diversity of views.1 3 On the other hand, the equality
principle also suggests the importance of prohibiting government
supervision of the broadcaster's selection from among competing
speakers and messages.
In any case, even though the CBS majority followed established
practice in placing strong reliance on FCC expertise, the Court's
adoption of a "rational basis" standard of review seems misguided
under the circumstances. First amendment interests are on both
sides of this issue. Just as it is a function of the judiciary to strike
the balance between the competing claims of the free exercise clause
and the establishment clause of the first amendment,' so it is the
courts' responsibility to strike the balance between competing first
amendment issues in the media-access cases. The expertise of the
FCC does not extend to constitutional interpretation.
The absence of an obvious stopping-place for the claim to ac-
cess to the broadcast media need not prevent the Supreme Court
from drawing any boundary at all. For example, to say that one has
a content-neutral right such as the right to have a paid advertise-
ment broadcast within the limits of time set aside by the broad-
"' The recent cases involving press interviews of prisoners can be seen in one dimension
as an aspect of the media-access problem. For an explicit reliance in such a context, see Main
Road v. Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the contrast between this
"speech" issue and the related "press" issue of the newsperson's right to access to prisoners
to gather news, see Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What
Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTrNGs L.J. 639, 641-44 (1975); cf. Lange, The
Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 77, 104-06 (1975); Nimmer, Speech and Press:
A Brief Reply, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 120, 122-23 (1975). Similarly, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972), has a media-access dimension; part of the public's interest in the newsperson's
claimed right to keep sources confidential is an interest in having the views of dissidents such
as the Black Panthers publicized. Cf. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
"I See note 89 supra.
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caster for advertising" 5 in no sense implies that the broadcaster
must devote all its time to editorial statements, paid or not. If the
principle of the fairness doctrine interferes with the process of set-
ting limits to the media-access claim, 46 perhaps the fairness doc-
trine should give way.
It is Red Lion'47 that is shaky, not the claim of a constitutional
right to media-access advanced by the CBS plaintiffs. The fairness
doctrine, upheld unanimously' in Red Lion in a right-of-reply situ-
ation, is an FCC directive to broadcasters to devote a reasonable
amount of time to coverage of public issues and to present contrast-
ing views on these issues.'49 Any process of continuing governmental
surveillance over broadcasting content presents truly grave dangers.
If the days of hunting "subversives" in the communications indus-
try seem safely remote,5 ' it is instructive to recall that President
Nixon's appointed Chairman of the FCC asked the television net-
works to furnish him with transcripts of their commentary on the
President's speeches. 5' Even though the right-of-reply portion of the
fairness doctrine upheld in Red Lion is less threatening than the
doctrine's more general insistence on fair coverage of issues, a right
of reply will give added encouragement to an editorial blandness
already promoted by the broadcasters' commercial advertisers; 52
broadcasters will simply minimize the number of newscasts to
which a fairness doctrine obligation will attach.
Similar reasoning led the Court in the Tornillo case, 5' decided
one year after CBS, to invalidate a Florida right-of-reply statute
I" On the implementation of such a right, see Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth-Century
Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REv. 574, 626-29
(1971); Canby, supra note 117, at 754-57.
119 See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARv. L. REV. 701 (1964).
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
' Justice Douglas did not participate in Red Lion. In CBS, he expressed his disagree-
ment with Red Lion, in the passage quoted in text at note 124 supra.
"I See generally Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and
Print Media, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 659 (1975); Note, Enforcing the Obligation to Present Contro-
versial Issues: The Forgotten Half of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARV. Civ. RIrHTs-Cv. LiB.
L. REv. 137 (1975).
I" See Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw &
EcoN. 15, 35-37, 45 n.96 (1967).
"I See Note, supra note 149, at 157 n.90. Equally instructive is a perusal of the 106 pages
devoted by the District of Columbia Circuit to the FCC's abortive attempt to force the NBC
television network to present views opposed to those expressed in the documentary, "Pen-
sions: The Broken Promise." Judge Leventhal has the better of these prolonged arguments,
from beginning to end. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
"' On the latter point, see Note, supra note 149, at 148-50.
" 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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directed at newspapers. The media-monopoly problem is arguably
even more serious in the daily press than in the broadcast media. 5 '
Yet the Court reacted to the remedy provided by the state ' with a
burst of first amendment absolutism that is, to put it mildly, un-
characteristic of the present Court:
However much validity may be found in these [access]
arguments, at each point the implementation of a remedy such
as an enforceable right of access necessarily calls for some
mechanism, either governmental or consensual. If it is govern-
mental coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation with
[the first amendment]. '
Since the Tornillo case could have been resolved by holding the
statute under attack to be unconstitutionally vague, 157 the selection
of such a broad ground for decision suggests that the Court was
eager to make a more general doctrinal statement. Its choice of
language supports this conclusion.
Unfortunately, the more general statement is so sweeping that
it is hard to believe the Court could possibly mean what it said. Any
governmental compulsion on a newspaper to print what it does not
choose to print, said the Court, is unconstitutional. The doctrine,
thus stated, would invalidate not only a right-of-reply statute, but
also a statute guaranteeing the right to paid advertising space' 8 as
well as a statute enabling a defamed plaintiff to compel the defam-
ing newspaper to publish a retraction.' 9 Once again, the Court has
"I But merely to count daily newspapers, radio stations, and television channels is to
ignore other branches of the press, from monthly magazines to underground newspapers. For
a thoughtful criticism of the arguments in favor of a right of access to the media, see Lange,
The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and
Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1973). For Lange's analysis of the statistics of the various
media, see id. at 15.
lu It would be inaccurate to describe the statute in Tomillo as a response to a modem
problem, since the law dates from 1913. 418 U.S. at 247.
"5 418 U.S. at 254 (footnotes omitted).
"s The Court did not reach the vagueness question, but the statute was vulnerable on
that ground, especially in giving the right of reply whenever a newspaper "assails the personal
character" of a candidate or "attacks his official record." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (1973).
'I This would be a situation parallel to that in the CBS case, with an FCC rule added
to guarantee the advertiser's right, but without the fairness doctrine hanging over the pub-
lisher's shoulder. Such statutes have been proposed from time to time. See Note, The Su-
preme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 180 n.45 (1974). Such a law would not eliminate
equal access problems, unless some means could be devised to prevent monopolization of
advertising space (or time) by the wealthy.
" Justice Brennan, by adding a one-paragraph concurrence, tried to except retraction
statutes from the Court's proscription of government compulsion of a newspaper. 418 U.S.
at 258-59.
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treated a claim to equality as an all-or-nothing proposition. And,
once again, the Court has opted in favor of nothing, despite its
lament that economic and technological changes have "place[d] in
a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape
public opinion."' 60
There is a vast and sophisticated literature on the media-access
problem, and it would be both silly and arrogant to try to resolve
such complex issues in a few pages.' The relevant analogy would
be those hourly bursts of news which the fairness doctrine forces into
the ears of radio listeners who only want to listen to the "Top 40."
Instead, this discussion has aimed at showing some ways in which
the first amendment's equality principle may be helpful in ap-
proaching the problem, and some ways in which it will provide next
to no help at all.
First, the equality principle's prohibition on government con-
trol of speech content is of limited use when the problem is one of
censorship by private broadcasters and newspapers. The point is not
that equality is somehow less desirable when a public forum is pri-
vately controlled, but that the equality principle also supports the
competing claim of the private censor to freedom from control of
speech content. Second, the equality principle suggests that if gov-
ernment surveillance can be minimized and compulsion over the
private owners of the media limited to a content-neutral principle,
such as a statutory right to paid advertising, then a court should
view sympathetically government action to overcome the impact of
private censorship. 16 2 Third, there is, at least in the broadcasting
area, no simple solution to the stopping-place problem in state ac-
tion doctrine.
Fourth, neither private censorship nor governmental action to
alleviate it can properly be tested against the permissive "rational
basis" standard of judicial review, since the competing interests in
the media-access cases are both of constitutional stature. There is
no room for a strong presumption of constitutionality in the CBS
situation for either the FCC's rejection of a right to paid advertising
time or the broadcaster's own policy of refusing such advertising.
Nor is there room in the Tornillo situation for a presumption in
'"Id. at 250.
" Lange, supra note 154, at 2 n.5, contains a footnote more than a page long listing
articles and other discussions of the media-access problem up to 1973. The literature is still
growing.
H62 The Court's deference to the FCC in the CBS case suggests that a modification of the
fairness doctrine to provide some limited forms of access to the broadcasting media might be
upheld, despite the absolutism of the CBS and Tornillo opinions.
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favor of a state right-of-reply law. The judiciary must itself face the
difficult task of accommodating competing constitutional interests.
Finally, the media-access problem is not to be dismissed with
absolutist abstractions about governmental compulsion. To say that
Marsh v. Alabama1 3 is right and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner'6 4 is wrong
is to accept and even require restrictions on the freedom of an owner
of a company town or a shopping center to censor the content of
messages conveyed in those places. Marsh is inconsistent with the
absolutist theory, for Marsh imposed restrictions on the owner's first
amendment freedoms as well as its property rights. Instead of an
absolute prohibition against government-imposed equal access,
each proposed claim to access must be addressed in the light of the
dynamics of the proposed government intrusion into the particular
communications medium and the likelihood of achieving a true di-
versity of views in the medium."5
VI. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND "EQUAL TREATMENT IN
THE VOTING PROCESS"
The Constitution nowhere explicity confers a right to vote on
anyone. But in 1964, the Supreme Court construed article I, section
2, of the Constitution to guarantee the right of "qualified" persons
10 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see text at note 109 supra.
164 407 U.S. 551 (1972); see text and note at note 107 supra.
"' Lange, supra note 154, at 77-89, presents a powerful argument to the effect that
recognition of a right of access to the mass media would, in general, not be likely to result in
much of an increase in the diversity of views expressed in the press or over the airwaves. Even
if that depressing assessment be true, the argument in the text stands: each medium of
communications, and each proposed access right, should be scrutinized separately along the
lines suggested. Cf. the view of Jackson, J., concurring in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97
(1949), that each medium is "a law unto itself."
Consider, for example, a law requiring newspapers to accept paid editorial advertising.
The burden on the newspaper's production would be minimal, and more than offset by
advertising revenue. The publisher would be commanded by law to publish something it
chose not to print. But: (a) the government would not identify subjects worth discussing; that
choice would be left to those who seek to advertise; (b) there would be no government
supervision to assure "fair" coverage of any issue; (c) there would be no regulation of message
content; and (d) the publisher could dissociate itself from any advertising message, both by
marginal notations and by editorial statements. The burden on the publisher's freedom, in
short, is minimal. Against this burden must be weighed the benefits of such a law in bringing
diversity of views to the public. Lange is probably right in suggesting that access laws will
not aid the truly deviant, but will produce a new "centrism" dominated by a slightly widened
mainstream. Lange, supra note 154, at 81-89. But to say that an excess rule will not do
everything (including providing a forum for incitement to riot and revolution) is not to say
that it will do nothing. A widened mainstream, with a greater diversity of views for the
newspaper's readers, is no small thing. The point is that the absolutism of the Tornillo
opinion makes just this sort of interest balancing irrelevant.
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to vote in federal elections. 6' A period of intensive constitutional
development had begun. Within the next decade, the Supreme
Court came to recognize a constitutional "right to equal treatment
in the voting process."'6 7
Although this newly fashioned right has been explained largely
as a derivation from the equal protection clause, it rests just as
soundly on the first amendment's principle of equal liberty of ex-
pression. Indeed, the first amendment demands an even greater
degree of equality in the electoral process than does the equal pro-
tection clause. The first amendment's equality principle applies
both to equality among voters and to equality among candidates
and parties.
A. First Amendment Foundations for "the Equal Right to Vote"
The core of the principle of equal liberty of expression is that
government action may not favor or disfavor expression because of
its content. Voting is political expression, not simply in the sense
of choosing among candidates and policies, but also in the sense of
making a statement about the public issues raised during a political
campaign. Furthermore, voting is the expression of each voter's
claim to the dignity of citizenship. 6 ' When the Supreme Court em-
braced the doctrine of "one person, one vote" in Reynolds v. Sims,'6
it recognized that voter equality was implicit in the idea of "[flull
and effective participation by all citizens in state government.' 70
Further, the Court said, quoting itself:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having
a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which,
as good citizens, we must live.' 7'
The perception of the vote as "voice" is scarcely new, but it captures
nicely the first amendment dimensions of the right to vote.
Just two years after Reynolds, the Court heard a challenge to
the constitutionality of a poll tax as a condition on voting in a state
election, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.17 The chal-
lenge was based not only on the equal protection clause, but also on
the first amendment. Voting was analogized by the appellants to
'. E.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
, San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74 (1973).
U See text at note 30 supra.
,, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
' Id. at 565.
,n Id. at 560, quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
172 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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lobbying and to pursuing social or political objectives through litiga-
tion, both of which had been held to be forms of first amendment
activity.1 3 Furthermore, voting was said to be, like the privacy of
political association, necessary to make the first amendment's ex-
plicit guarantees effective. 74 As the Court had previously said:
"Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote
is undermined. 1 ' 75
In reversing the three-judge district court's dismissal, the Court
did "not stop to canvass the relation between voting and political
expression,' ' 78 but held that'the poll tax as a condition on voting in
state elections was invalid under the equal protection clause. 77 The
Harper opinion set the pattern for a series of decisions striking down
various types of voter qualifications such as property ownership 78 or
lengthy residence in the state.' 71 In San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,'18 the Court summarized these decisions, all
based on the equal protection clause, by saying there was now a
constitutional "right to equal treatment in the voting process.''8
Because voting is the most basic act of political expression, the
same decisions can be seen as illustrating the equality principle of
the first amendment. The poll tax, for example, was defended by
Justice Harlan on the ground that the state could rationally con-
clude:
that people with some property have a deeper stake in com-
munity affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more
educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence,
than those without means, and that the community and Na-
tion would be better managed if the franchise were restricted
to such citizens.'8 2
But this result is precisely what the first amendment's equality
principle prohibits: a selective restriction on expression, based on
I" NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31 (1963) (litigation to pursue social objectives);
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (lobbying).
"I Brief for Apellant at 14-17, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
For the political-association analogy, the brief relied on NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
,' Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
' 383 U.S. at 665.
177 Id.
178 E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
,T' Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
,8 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
,' Id. at 34 n.74.
,82 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 685 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the ideas and sentiments likely to be expressed. The "stake in com-
munity affairs" of a property owner, as a determinant of a point of
view, is an impermissible basis for the state's decision to permit or
forbid political expression.
The Court reviewed with approval the property-qualification
cases along with the whole line of voting-equality cases when it
invalidated a one-year residence requirement for voting in a state
election.1 3 Because the law restricted the right to vote, it could be
sustained only upon a showing that it was necessary to effect a
compelling state interest and that there were no "other, reasonable
ways to achieve [the state's] goals with a lesser burden on constitu-
tionally protected activity."'8 4 For this "less drastic means" proposi-
tion, the Court cited three first amendment decisions, including the
political-privacy case involving the Arkansas teachers. 8 5
The voter-qualification cases, seen as first amendment cases,
come to this: No citizen can be denied the right to "participate in
political affairs or in the selection of public officials""' unless that
denial is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Any denial
of a voice in the affairs of the political community 7 demands strict
judicial scrutiny because that voice is protected by the first amend-
ment.
Thus far, the first amendment right to vote looks much like the
guarantee of equal protection as applied to the "fundamental" in-
terest in voting.' A voting qualification based on age, for example,
must pass the compelling-state-interest test under either formula. 8'
In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Although this case too was decided on equal
protection grounds, the Court justified its decision to subject the statute to strict scrutiny in
part because it impinged on the opportunity to vote, a right which, as we have seen, also has
a first amendment basis.
I" Id. at 343.
In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); see text and note at note 114 supra.
I" Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
I" The Court relied on this notion of a political community in excluding the rights to
vote and hold high office from those to which aliens are presumptively entitled. Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). On a similar theory, voting may be limited to residents
of a state. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972). Perhaps a case such as Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), upholding a "no-raiding" law designed to keep members of
one political party from switching over to vote in another party's primary, also rests partly
on the same theoretical base.
In At a minimum, the notion of voting as a constitutional right gives doctrinal support
to the strict scrutiny which the Court applies, in the name of equal protection, to regulations
of the electoral process. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74
(1973).
" Justice Stewart, in his separate opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 294
(1970), remarked:
[To test the power to establish an age qualification [to vote] by the "compelling
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But recognition of the first amendment right will make a difference
where a state disqualifies convicted felons from voting. In
Richardson v. Ramirez,"' the Supreme Court upheld such a disqual-
ification on the strength of section 2 of the fourteenth amendment,
which, the Court held, limited the applicability of the equal protec-
tion clause. 9' When considered merely as an equal protection case,
the disqualification of ex-felons is thus not required to withstand
any judicial scrutiny whatever. But within the framework of the first
amendment's equality principle, any disqualification of voters must
be justified as necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. For
the reasons stated by Justice Marshall in Richardson, no such justi-
fication can be found for disqualifying ex-felons from voting. 112
Nor will literacy tests survive the first amendment right to
equality in voting-assuming, that is, that they ever return from the
interest" standard is really to deny a State any choice at all, because no State could
demonstrate a "compelling interest" in drawing the line with respect to age at one point
rather than another.
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist complained of Justice Stewart's "irrebuttable presumptions"
doctrine as announced in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974):
Nothing in the Court's opinion clearly demonstrates why its logic would not equally well
sustain a challenge. . . from a 17-year-old who insists that he is just as well informed
for voting purposes as an 18-year-old ....
414 U.S. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, age discrimination does seem a good
candidate for one of the stricter forms of judicial scrutiny. The point has relevance for the
first amendment as well as the equal protection clause, despite the abstractness of a case like
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See Letwin, Regulation of Underground
Newspapers on Public School Campuses in California, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 141, 187-205
(1974), criticizing the usual arguments for assuming away the first amendment rights of
children.
The point is not that 17-year-olds, or 16-year-olds, must be allowed to vote. The point is
that both the first amendment and the equal protection clause demand strict scrutiny of any
denial of the right to vote. Since no one has yet effectively explained what qualities voters
are supposed to have, apart from a concern for their own interests, Justice Stewart is correct
in saying it would be hard to justify any particular age limit as necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest.
One very important by-product of a claim to equality is that it compels a reexamination
of the reasons someone is not treated equally. Perhaps 17-year-olds should vote, if we cannot
think of any very good reason for disqualifying them. More likely, however, the courts will
find that the state legislatures have discerned an age of maturity-or, alternatively, that the
twenty-sixth amendment, in setting the age of 18 as a constitutional maximum, has impliedly
authorized the setting of 18 as a minimum. Cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-56
(1974), upholding the denial of the vote to ex-felons on a similar textual argument.
'"418 U.S. 24 (1974).
", Section 2 provides for the reduction of representation in Congress of any state that
denies the vote to male citizens over 21 "except for participation in rebellion, or other crime."
It would not be impossible for the present Court to conclude that the same provision impliedly
limits the reach of the first amendment; it would merely be silly.
1 418 U.S. at 77-86.
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limbo to which Congress sent them in 1970."13 A literacy qualifica-
tion is related not to maturity of judgment, but to the capacity to
be informed through the particular mode of the printed word. In an
era when 95 percent of the homes in the country have television sets,
turned on for an average of more than five hours a day,'94 the ability
to read a newspaper is scarcely required for an understanding of
public affairs. More important, many of the illiterate belong to im-
poverished racial and ethnic minorities; and even to the extent they
do not, the illiterate are apt to share significant interests and opin-
ions with those who are disadvantaged in other ways, such as the
poor. It is hard to resist the conclusion that literacy tests, like prop-
erty qualifications and poll taxes, have been used to limit the vote
to those who can be counted on to be "responsible"-in other words,
to vote according to a particular cluster of ideologies. The first
amendment's equality principle forbids such a limitation on the
voice embodied in the right to vote.
The first amendment's equality principle also casts new light
on the Court's apportionment cases. One of the best-known pas-
sages of Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Reynolds v. Sims is his
comment:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests."5
In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that it would be
more meaningful to note that people are not ciphers and that
legislators can represent their electors only by speaking for
their interests-economic, social, political-many of which do
reflect the place where the electors live.'98
Of course legislators represent people by representing interests. But
the holding of Reynolds v. Sims is that a state cannot constitution-
ally discriminate among voters by giving some interests greater pro-
portional weight than is justified by the numbers of people who
share those interests.
The first amendment's principle of equal liberty of expression
"' The 1970 Voting Rights Act, upheld in this respect in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970), forbade the use of literacy tests for voting for a five-year period. In 1975, this
prohibition was made a permanent part of the Act, and the Act itself was extended for seven
years. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 102, 89 Stat. 400, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b (Supp.
5, 1975).
" N. JOHNSON, How To TALK BACK To YOUR TELEVISION SET 13 (1970).
', 377 U.S. at 562.
" Id. at 623-24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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demands the same conclusion. Just as the hours available in a pub-
lic forum may not be weighted according to the content of a mes-
sage, because the first amendment protects speakers as well as
ideas, '9 political expression by voting may not be weighted accord-
ing to the content of a vote. Justice Harlan's view is, in a sense, a
claim that each interest is entitled to "access" to the legislative
halls. But not even the most zealous advocate of a right of access to
the media would propose that government set aside a weighted
number of a newspaper's columns to assure that a particular point
of view be satisfactorily represented.' 8
For the most part, the first amendment's equality principle will
produce results in apportionment cases similar to those reached
under the equal protection clause. But in some cases, application
of a rigorous first amendment analysis will reveal the weaknesses of
the equal protection decisions. The Court's recent tolerance for the
"de minimis" variations in state-legislative-district equality,'99 for
example, is questionable when viewed against'the first amendment.
And its acceptance of "supermajorities"' ' ° is a plain violation of the
first amendment's equality principle. A two-thirds vote requirement
for the passage of a ballot proposition is the clearest example of
content discrimination: a "No" vote equals two "Yes" votes.2"' In
Gordon v. Lance, the Court impliedly reaffirmed that a weighting
of votes that results in discrimination against a "discrete and insu-
lar minority," such as a racial group, would be invalid under the
equal protection clause. 22 The first amendment's equality principle
is not so limited, but extends to discrimination against any expres-
sion on the basis of its content, regardless of the nature of the disfa-
vored group.
Racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional under either an
equal protection (or fifteenth amendment) approach or the principle
of equal liberty of expression. But the first amendment provides
another reason to abandon the untenable distinction between
117 See text at notes 99-100 supra.
"I The fairness doctrine, see text at note 147 supra, seems constitutionally suspect be-
cause it does something very much like this.
'" See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973).
20 Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
20' In the case of supermajority requirements, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the
exercise of the right of expression of those who intend to vote for the proposition for which a
supermajority is required will be chilled by the futility of attempts to overcome this content
discrimination.
20 403 U.S. at 5.
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Southern racial gerrymanders, which are usually held invalid, °3 and
Northern racial gerrymanders, which are valid unless proved to be
invidiously motivated.'0 ' Finally, political gerrymandering, which
the present Court seems prepared to accept under equal protection
analysis,2  is vulnerable to the first amendment equality principle
because it presents an obvious discrimination by government
against political expression on the basis of its content.2 6
The "equal right to vote, 2 7 as announced in the Court's opin-
ions to date, is a right based on the equal protection clause. But, as
Justice Brennan recently said, it is also a first amendment right.2 1
B. The Equality Principle and Access to the Ballot for Candidates
and Parties
If the first amendment principle of equal liberty of expression
underlies the right to vote, then it unquestionably underlies the
rights of those seeking a place on the election ballot, the supreme
political forum. It must, in short, guarantee a place on the ballot to
anyone who meets the qualifications of the office in question20 un-
less the exclusion of that person is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. The Supreme Court has relied on both the equal
protection clause and the first amendment in reaching this result.
This dual doctrinal approach was first used in Williams v.
Rhodes, 2 1 where the Court invalidated a state law limiting access
263 E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). But cf. Dallas County v. Reese, 95
S. Ct. 1706 (1975). See also Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942
(1972).
2 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
This North-South division is criticized in Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at
Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383,
397-404.
See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
IN "Racial and ethnic gerrymandering are subcategories of political gerrymandering;
their ultimate purpose is always political." Comment, Political Gerrymandering: A Statutory
Compactness Standard as an Antidote for Judicial Impotence, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 398 n.5
(1974). The kind of statutory standard suggested in the quoted comment would not seem to
be beyond a court's capacities as a constitutional standard. Most impotence, we now know,
is psychological.
2* Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 426 (1970).
2*1 In his dissenting opinion in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974), Justice Brennan
said:
The right to vote derives from the right of association that is at the core of the First
Amendment ....
"' These qualifications are themselves subject to examination under both the equal
protection clause and the first amendment. For an equal protection analysis, see
Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1111, 1217-33 (1975) (excellent stu-
dent treatment of election law beyond the franchise) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
210 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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to the general-election ballot to candidates nominated by "estab-
lished" parties-those that had obtained at least 10 percent of the
votes in the last gubernatorial election-or by any party able to
secure signatures on nominating petitions equal to 15 percent of
those who voted in the last election.211 Justice Black's opinion for the
Court discussed both the first amendment freedom of political asso-
ciation and the equal protection clause, but based the decision on
the latter, applying a strict-scrutiny standard of review.2 12
Strict scrutiny was called for because two fundamental inter-
ests, the right to vote213 and the freedom of political association,
were restricted by the state's system. The Court then rejected the
state's claim that the promotion of a two-party system was a com-
pelling interest:
The fact is, however, that the Ohio system does not merely
favor a "two-party system"; it favors two particular parties-
the Republicans and the Democrats-and in effect tends to
give them a complete monopoly. There is, of course, no reason
why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the
right to have people vote for or against them. Competition in
ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral
process and of the First Amendment freedoms.21 1
Like the Mosley opinion, the opinion in Williams v. Rhodes rests
its decision on the equal protection clause only after demonstrating
that the crucial constitutional interests at stake are first amend-
ment interests.
The Court has made frequent use of the Williams rationale in
cases involving both minority parties and independent candidates.
After some initial confusion, the Court has refined that rationale to
what may be stated as a general principle: A state may constitution-
ally insist that a candidate or a party have "significant support"
before being placed on the ballot, but any system of restrictions
211 The petitions had to be submitted nine months before the election.
212 Latent in the Court's opinion, as a basis for strict-scrutiny review under the equal
protection clause, is the notion of a first amendment right to vote. See note 188 supra. Justice
Douglas concurred in the opinion of the Court, but wrote separately to emphasize the first
amendment ground for decision. 393 U.S. at 35. Justice Harlan concurred solely on the basis
of the first amendment. 393 U.S. at 41.
2I Even under the challenged statute, no voter was disqualified from voting in the gen-
eral election; by giving a constitutional dimension to the interest in voting for a particular
party or candidate, the Court underlined the expressive aspects of voting, and thus the first
amendment interest in the franchise. This view of the right to vote is reaffirmed in the filing-
fee case of Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 713-14 (1974).
2 393 U.S. at 32.
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must permit a "reasonably diligent" candidate or party to qualify. 215
The Court continues to scrutinize strictly the way in which a state
regulates access to the ballot; in order to pass muster under both
the first amendment and the equal protection clause, the restric-
tions must be "essential to serve a compelling state interest. 2 16
Since sightings of compelling interests have been rarer than
sightings of abominable snowmen, that test sounds formidable, es-
pecially in view of the plain availability of less burdensome means
of achieving the particular state interest. Nonetheless, in the most
recent ballot-access cases, the Court has found certain interests to
be compelling: the avoidance of the voter confusion resulting from
a long ballot and "preservation of the integrity of the electoral pro-
cess."217 The latter phrase appears to refer primarily to the avoid-
ance of "frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. ' 218 The Court has been
criticized for not characterizing yet another state interest as
"compelling": the interest in preserving a two-party system to avoid
excessive factionalism and promote stability. 29 Testing these three
ostensibly compelling interests against the first amendment's equal-
ity principle reveals that one sighting is false, and the others open
to question.
A plausible explanation for the Court's-reluctance to treat the
preservation of the two-party system as a compelling interest is that
this interest is flatly inconsistent with the first amendment's guar-
antee of equal liberty of expression. To score the easy point first,
there is no analytic force to the distinction drawn by Justice Black
in his majority opinion in Williams v. Rhodes, between preserving
a two-party system and preserving the current two-party system.20
Maintaining the dominance of the Democratic and Republican par-
ties in the political market is a patently impermissible state goal
because it strikes at the heart of the first amendment's guarantee
of "equality of status in the field of ideas. ' 221 The same reasoning
would hold even if a two-party system somehow could be main-
2' Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738-40 (1974); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767
(1974); see Developments 1139-44.
21 Storer v. Brown, note 215 supra, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1974). The Supreme Court of
California has recently applied the compelling state interest test to a city charter provision
requiring the listing of incumbents first on city election ballots. The court held the provision
invalid under the equal protection clause and the analogous clauses of the state constitution.
Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d. 661, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 536 P.2d 1337 (1975).
2,7 American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974).
2,, Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
21, Developments 1138-39, 1141-42.
2 393 U.S. at 31-32. This point is made in Developments at 1138.
22 A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 25, at 27.
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tained without preserving the existing duopoly. Surely a state could
not demonstrate that this means of chilling the expression of minor-
ity political viewpoints was necessary to effect a compelling state
purpose.
Although minority parties and independent candidates rarely
win major elections, their role in influencing the major parties is
well known. Moreover, the public's post-Watergate distrust of tradi-
tional politicians promises even greater success for minority parties
in the future.221 It seems certain that fear of minority party gains
prompted Republicans and Democrats in state legislatures around
the country to enact these ballot-access restrictions in the first
place.
The situation is thus an ideal opportunity for application of
Chief Justice Stone's famous footnote suggesting "searching judicial
inquiry" into legislation that "tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities. ' 23 Even if minority parties and independent candi-
dates always lost and never managed to influence the major parties,
the equality principle of the first amendment would forbid exclud-
ing them in order to promote parties with different philosophies.
The view that favors "a politics of coalition and accommodation" 2 4
over fragmentation is itself a political ideology the state is forbidden
to favor.225
If preserving the two-party system is an illegitimate state inter-
est, only the two interests actually suggested by the Court remain
for serious consideration. By analogy to the "no-raiding" rules up-
held by the Court, 26 the interest in avoiding fraudulent candidacies
seems legitimate. If three Jane Smiths enter an election to distract
the voters from one particular Jane Smith, the state has good reason
to worry about the health of the democratic process, although there
222 In 1974, an independent candidate was elected Governor of Maine. On the role of
minority parties and independent candidates, see Developments 1123.
223 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
22 A. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY 22 (1971), quoted in Developments at 1138.
22 But cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974), recognizing the legitimacy of pro-
tecting the state's "interest in the stability of its political system" against "splintered parties
and unrestrained factionalism." That interest may survive scrutiny under the equal protec-
tion clause, but the first amendment's equality principle makes it illegitimate as a justifica-
tion of discriminating against offering minority political positions to the electorate.
23 Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973). In Rosario, the Court rejected an attack
on a New York statute that imposed a lengthy enrollment requirement for voting in party
primaries. The statute's justifiable purpose was "to inhibit party 'raiding,' whereby voters
in sympathy with one party designate themselves as voters of another party so as to influence
or determine the results of the other party's primary." Id. at 760.
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appears to be no cure for this particular abuse that would be consti-
tutional.
There is another kind of fraudulent candidacy that may arouse
the state's concern. When a member of one party seeks to run in
another party's primary, it seems equally sensible to seek to prevent
that candidacy. 27 Although preventive measures would interfere
with the would-be candidate's equal right of political association,
the alternative would be to ignore the state's interest in avoiding
subversion of the primary by deceiving the party's members, itself
an interest of first amendment dimension.22 8
The issue is nevertheless troublesome. The first amendment
requires an assumption that the best judges of deception in political
expression are the people. Censorship of political speech is imper-
missible even if the speech is false. Why not trust independents, for
example, to find out for themselves that a candidate who purports
to be independent was, in fact, until last week a member of the
Democratic Party-and in voting to give that fact whatever weight
they think it deserves? Should government decide when a candidacy
is "frivolous"? More important, how should such a determination
be made?
The same sort of question can be asked about the voter
confusion that, it is often assumed, might result from having a large
number of candidates on the ballot. At some point, the concern
takes on substance-say, if the voters are handed a list of a thou-
sand names and told to "vote for seven." But even here the assump-
tion that the voters need the state's guidance in making their selec-
tions is dangerously paternalistic. Moreover, it seems doubtful that
liberalizing the requirements for ballot access would typically trig-
ger a great proliferation of candidates; is there really a compelling
state interest in having only four candidates for governor on the
ballot rather than eight?
The existing doctrines governing ballot-access cases are still so
general that a fair number of such cases should continue to come to
the Court. As the Court applies these broad doctrines to a variety
of legislative and factual settings, the questions raised here will
become increasingly prominent. The most encouraging feature of
the newest decisions in this area is their insistence on particularized
exploration of the question whether minority parties and indepen-
dent candidates have a "real and essentially equal opportunity for
2z Thirty states require some form of party affiliation. See Developments 1175-76.
2 Cf. note 187 supra, discussing the relevance of the concept of a "political community."
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ballot qualification. ' 2 9
The role of the first amendment's equality principle in the elec-
toral process should not be limited to the ballot access and voter-
equality cases. The principle finds easy application to the
candidate-filing-fee cases, 21° and to such qualifications for office as
property ownership.23 Durational residence requirements for candi-
dates present a harder question, but surely not, as has been sug-
gested,22 because strict scrutiny is inappropriate.
The thorniest issues for the equality principle in the elections
field are those raised by the regulation of campaign financing.233
These widespread laws are motivated by egalitarian goals of the
highest order, such as preventing the buying of office or governmen-
tal favors. Yet at least some of the laws involve what can only be
called discrimination based on speech content. Prohibitions against
corporations' or unions' making political contributions, for example,
raise the gravest problems of selective content censorship. 24 Here,
as in the media-access cases, the courts are only beginning to ex-
plore the limits of what the first amendment will allow, and what
it may demand. Like the media-access cases, any campaign-finance
regulation calls for particularized balancing of the benefits it may
provide by increasing diversity of political expression against its
2n American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 788 (1974).
2 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). In their
first amendment aspects, the poll-tax and property-qualification cases readily support these
recent filing-fee decisions, see text and notes at notes 172-82 supra. See Justice Douglas's
concurring opinion in Lubin v. Panish, supra at 719-22.
21 The approval in Developments at 1220-21 of a rational basis standard of review for
such qualifications for office is unjustified in view of the first amendment interest at stake.
Furthermore, since such qualifications infringe the right to vote, see note 213 supra, strict
scrutiny is required under the equal protection clause.
In any case, a property qualification for holding office fails even the rational basis test.
See Developments at 1221-23. The Court so held in Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361-64
(1970), seemingly giving "rational basis" the tougher meaning it has been given in a number
of decisions in the past five years. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
222 Developments 1227. The point would be that a reasonable durational residence quali-
fication for office arguably serves a compelling state interest by providing officials with some
experience in the community. Given the first amendment interests of the would-be candidate,
however, this is a difficult issue. Cf. Note, The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88
HARV. L. Rav. 1571, 1574-79 (1975).
See generally Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity:
The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. REV. 389
(1973); Developments 1237-71, and the many discussions there cited.
2 See Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148, 161-65 (1974).
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costs to political freedom. 235 No slogan-not even Equality-can
substitute for such an inquiry.
VII. THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE AS A PREFERRED GROUND
Late last term, the Supreme Court decided one of those cases
destined to go into the constitutional law casebooks only as a foot-
note. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,235 the Court invalidated
a city ordinance prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from showing
films, visible from public streets, that included nudity. The city had
sought to justify the ordinance on three grounds: protection of the
privacy of citizens against unwilling exposure to offensive material;
protection of children; and protection against traffic hazards.
Erznoznik is noteworthy for the repeated emphasis in Justice Pow-
ell's opinion for the Court on the equality principle of the first
amendment.
In response to the privacy argument, the Court admitted that
regulation of speech might sometimes be appropriate to protect pri-
vacy. But, said Justice Powell:
[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selec-
tively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that they are more offensive than others, the First
Amendment strictly limits its power. See, e.g., Police Depart-
ment of Chicago v. Mosley. .... ?1
Only an "intolerable" invasion of a "substantial" privacy interest,
the Court reasoned, would justify repression;2 8 here the passer-by
who was offended could simply look away.
Second, in response to the protection-of-children argument, the
Court relied on the ground that the ordinance's restriction was
"broader than permissible," since in banning all nudity it was not
tailored to an identified state interest.23 Third, the ordinance,
n1 Whatever may be the constitutional fate of campaign spending limitations and disclo-
sure requirements in general, the latter should not survive close judicial scrutiny when they
are applied to minor parties. Donors who are asked to contribute to unpopular causes may
refuse to do so if they face exposure. The political privacy cases discussed in the text at notes
111-16 supra are very much in point. See Judge Bazelon's opinion, dissenting in part, in
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 907 (D.C. Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 96 S. Ct. 32 (1975), for a
careful analysis of the issue. Judge Bazelon notes that the effect of disclosure on donations
to minor parties is a form of content discrimination, invalid under Mosley. 519 F.2d at 909
n.14.
' 95 S. Ct. 2268 (1975).
'T Id. at 2272.
23 Id. at 2273 (quoting from Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
2' Id. at 2274.
19751
The University of Chicago Law Review
viewed as a traffic regulation, also violated the equality principle:
By singling out movies containing even the most fleeting and
innocent glimpses of nudity the legislative classification is
strikingly underinclusive. There is no reason to think that a
wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen diet, rang-
ing from soap opera to violence, would be any less distracting
to the passing motorist.
This Court frequently has upheld underinclusive classifi-
cations on the sound theory that a legislature may deal with
one part of a problem without addressing all of it. . . . This
presumption of statutory validity, however, has less force when
a classification turns on the subject matter of expression.
"[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its mes-
sage, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dept.
of Chicago v. Mosley. . . . Thus, "under the Equal Protection
Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself,". . . even
a traffic regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content
unless there are clear reasons for the distinctions. See also Cox
v. Louisiana. . . (opinion of Black, J.). Cf. Williams v. Rhodes
240
The Erznoznik opinion is in no sense unusual. The citation and
quotation of Mosley is becoming commonplace as a shorthand for
the first amendment's principle of equal liberty of expression.2 41 And
the equality principle is becoming a preferred ground for decision.242
The reasons are easy to see. The principle permits the Court to
protect first amendment activity without making a frontal attack
24 Id. at 2275-76. Justice Douglas, concurring, agreed that the ordinance was "fatally
overinclusive in some respects and fatally underinclusive in others." Id. at 2277.
241 E.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16, 34 (1973); id., 411
U.S. at 61 (Stewart, J., concurring); Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 129-130 (1973); id., 412 U.S. at 39 (Stewart, J., concurring); Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 303 (1974); id., 418 U.S. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1020 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct.
214 (1975); Aiona v. Pai, 516 F.2d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1975); Gay Students Organization v.
Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 661 (1st Cir. 1974).
212 An interesting parallel development is the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which
provides for damages for conspiratorial deprivations of equal protection, to first amendment
interests. In Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975), the court held that
section 1985(3) reached the conduct of a police officer who took a poster from a woman and
destroyed it, because it was, in his view, "detrimental to the President," who was passing
by. But cf. Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1),
providing for removal of state-court proceedings to a federal court where one is denied "equal
civil rights," does not include first amendment rights in the quoted phrase.
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on the legitimacy of the interest by which the state seeks to justify
its regulation. Deciding, for example, that a particular statute is
invalid because it is not narrowly tailored to the state's interest does
not prohibit the state from attempting to further the same interest
by other means. Analyzing a first amendment case within the
framework of the equality principle thus may encourage the Court
to be somewhat more interventionist in making doctrine.
Furthermore, the idea of equal treatment has a special emotional
appeal, not only to the Justices, but to the Court's varied consti-
tuencies, including the public.
There are additional reasons for believing that the equality
principle will turn out to be more protective of speech than
previously-established first amendment doctrines. As Justice Jack-
son saw in Railway Express,24 using an equal protection analysis to
invalidate legislation will force legislators to face the question of
whether they want to impose a particular regulation on everyone.
It is simply not true that the automatic legislative reaction will be
to do just that.244 Harry Kalven, as always, is instructive on the
point:
Everyone at some time or other loves a parade whatever its
effect on traffic and other uses of public streets. Municipalities
pressed by concern with the protest movement may be inhib-
ited in any rush to flat nondiscriminatory prohibitions by the
difficulty of distinguishing between the parades we like and
others. Equal protection may, therefore, require freedom for
the parades we hate.245
Finally, the equality principle is apt to protect speech because
it places an affirmative burden on those who would justify a restric-
tion on expression to demonstrate that it is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest. The recent development of stricter forms
of judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause cannot fail to
influence the courts as they examine first amendment interests in
the light of the equality principle. Just as the principle of equality
permits a court to engage in a narrower, more focused form of inter-
vention into the legislative process, so the equality principle re-
quires particularized inquiry into the state's asserted reasons for
limiting speech.
It would have been extraordinary if the egalitarian impulses of
213 See text at note 23 supra.
244 It is so argued in Note, supra note 7, at 476-77.
245 Kalven, supra note 41, at 30.
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the past generation had not made a significant impact on first
amendment decisions and theory. In this area of constitutional law,
as throughout American society, claims to equality have demanded
a critical re-examination of fundamental principles. As a result, the
essential principles of a system of free expression now emerge in
sharper relief. At the heart of that system, part of the "central
meaning" of the first amendment, is the guarantee of equal liberty
of expression.
